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Abstract
Recent changes in the Common Agricultural Policy have focused attention on the possibility of an enlarged  
crop insurance program in Europe.  Several  countries in the European Union already have national  crop 
insurance schemes, but the performance of these programs in terms of realized demand has been low. In  
some  cases,  participation  in  the  programs  remains  low  in  spite  of  significant  subsidies  to  insurance 
premiums. This situation can be contrasted with the federal crop insurance program in the United States,  
which is now the principal instrument of American agricultural policy and insured over 366 million acres in  
2015. We focus on two questions: are there any justifications for subsidized crop insurance and how could 
such a scheme possibly be implemented in the EU? Quantitative and qualitative comparisons of the current 
state of crop insurance in the EU and US serve to motivate our observations.
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Crop Insurance in the European Union: 
Lessons and Caution from the United States
Crop insurance is an important risk management tool for agricultural producers. It is also becoming 
increasingly significant,  in  both Europe and the United States,  as  an instrument  of  agricultural 
policy. Revisions to the Common Agricultural Policy support the subsidization of crop insurance 
premiums  by  EU  member  states  with  the  EU  providing  backing  for  national  crop  insurance 
programs, but there has been less consideration of how risk management might be unified within 
the  EU.  Both  the  European  Commission  and  the  European  Parliament  have  opened  calls  for 
additional studies on risk coping strategies in agriculture. In spite of these recent calls, two key 
questions remain: will the benefits from a European crop insurance scheme outweigh the costs? 
How could such a scheme be designed?
A tentative answer to this question can be found in the crop insurance system in the United States. 
The US federal crop insurance program is the largest subsidized agricultural insurance program in 
the world. For major grains, in excess of 85% percent of planted acres are insured under a crop 
insurance  policy  sold  through  the  federal  program (ARMS,  2010).  The  size  of  a  government 
program is no indicator that it maximizes social welfare, but it does frequently signal a large burden 
for taxpayers. And, as is typical of many interventions, distortions can occur in both underlying and 
secondary markets (Goodwin and Smith, 2013).
Federal crop insurance is now the most expensive instrument of agricultural policy in the US. The 
Congressional  Budget  Office  estimated  that  nearly  27  billion  dollars  in  cost  savings  could  be 
realized over ten years if administrative expenses were limited and premium subsidies were reduced 
from 60 to 40 percent. Federal crop insurance may also come under increasing attack at the World 
Trade Organization (Glauber, 2015). Recognizing possible benefits and costs, the results of any 
insurance program ultimately depend on implementation and specific policy proposals.
By comparing the situation in the EU with the more developed crop insurance program in the 
United States, we offer some conclusions for policymakers. What are some important features of 
crop insurance in the United States? Could a similar scheme be implemented in the EU, and are  
there any barriers specific to the European case? One must make some generalizations in arriving at 
answers to these questions. Nonetheless, some conclusions can be reached. It would be possible to 
achieve  a  widespread  crop  insurance  program  in  the  EU,  but  there  are  significant  hurdles  to 
implementation. These hurdles are both actuarial and fiscal. A major problem is the heterogeneous 
nature of agriculture across member states. Furthermore, many scholars believe that there is little 
economic  justification  for  subsidized  crop  insurance,  except  as  a  replacement  for  other  policy 
measures. Whether a crop insurance program would be able to achieve policy goals more efficiently 
is a question for further research and discussion.
Pros and Cons of Subsidized Agricultural Insurance
The often stated rationale behind government crop insurance programs is to increase the resilience 
of farmers to major shocks to their incomes. Government intervention in these markets is justified 
through claims of market failure or missing markets. Some authors have argued that due to the 
spatially correlated and state dependent nature of agricultural risks, private markets for agricultural 
insurance are unlikely to develop (Miranda and Glauber, 1997). Without government intervention, 
farmers will not have access to crop insurance as a tool for managing production and price risks.  
But as Goodwin and Smith (2012) note, the absence of a crop insurance market is not conclusive 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  some type  of  market  failure.  Supply  and  demand  simply  do  not 
intersect at a feasible price in the market.
The notion of market failure in crop insurance rests on the assumption that agricultural insurance 
provides an external benefit, and thus the market demand for insurance does not capture benefits to 
society. One can arrive at similar conclusions by considering the agricultural sector to be a type of 
public good. Precisely what this externality entails, or the exact nature of the public good, is usually 
not explicitly stated. Under such arguments, it is exceedingly difficult to determine the magnitude 
of any external benefits to society. If the size of these external benefits cannot be determined, then it 
is highly unlikely that government intervention will result in the optimal supply of the good. The 
market failure argument provides little economic justification for the development of subsidized 
crop insurance programs. Market failure is either nonexistent or correction of the failure is wholly 
impractical.
Even  if  no  market  failure  exists,  there  may  be  some  justification  of  public  support  for  crop 
insurance as one component of a broader portfolio of agricultural policies. If political institutions 
have already determined that agriculture will be supported, or a social concern for rural livelihoods 
exists, the economic problem is then one of achieving this support in the most efficient way. An 
ideally realized crop insurance program has the potential to be less distorting than other agricultural  
support measures. It may also be more politically palatable as farmers who pay at least a portion of 
the insurance premium have “skin in the game.”
In particular, subsidized crop insurance is often promoted as a substitute for disaster payments. The 
problem with many ad-hoc disaster payment programs is that the standard for determining whether 
a disaster has occurred is usually not explicitly specified. Payments are then subject to the political  
system. The end result is that the incidence and magnitude of payments are often determined not by 
farm losses, but by the distribution of political power (Chang and Zilberman, 2012). If insurance 
providers  and  ratemakers  are  sufficiently  removed  from  political  influence,  crop  insurance 
programs may be able to remedy this divergence of goals and outcomes. To facilitate oversight by 
watchdog groups and other policymakers, actuarial guidelines and program statistics can be made 
publicly available.
Once a crop insurance program is in place, a host of new problems arise. Adverse selection occurs 
when insurers do not charge an appropriate rate for the risk associated with insuring a particular 
policyholder. Farmers who have been charged a rate that is too high leave the program, while those 
who have been charged a low rate remain in the program. The insurer will pay out more on the 
insurance product than he takes in premiums, and the market will fizzle out over time. To combat  
adverse selection, it is vitally important that insurance rates are as actuarially fair as possible. A 
related  problem  is  moral  hazard,  where  policyholders  undertake  actions  that  increase  their 
likelihood or magnitude of loss. Moral hazard in agricultural insurance can lead to a reduction in 
farmers’ use of other risk coping mechanisms. Both adverse selection and moral hazard result from 
information  asymmetries  between  the  insurer  and  the  farmer.  Correcting  this  asymmetry  (i.e. 
obtaining more information for the insurer) is usually a costly and difficult endeavor.
One benefit of a large crop insurance program is that it  becomes relatively easy to tie program 
participation  to  other  policies.  For  instance,  compliance  with  environmental  measures  and best 
practices  could  be  a  prerequisite  for  insurance  purchases.  Linking  the  insurance  scheme  to 
“greening” measures  may help to  enhance  participation.  Catastrophic insurance  coverage could 
become mandatory for farmers who sign up for other countercyclical loss programs. Bundling the 
insurance in this way would increase demand for the underlying product and alleviate problems that 
can occur because of adverse selection. While there is nothing unique about crop insurance in this 
regard, it is arguably a better vehicle for cross-compliance than ad-hoc payments or other distorting 
agricultural policies.
There are a number of other problems that can arise with agricultural  insurance, but the issues 
mentioned above seem to have garnered the most attention. The most compelling argument for a 
subsidized program is that insurance could offer cost savings over ad-hoc disaster programs or other 
forms  of  subsidy.  But  if  a  program is  to  substitute  for  disaster  payments,  it  must  have  high 
participation. Program designs must also grapple with issues of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
These were the issues that confronted policymakers in the US when they sought to expand federal 
crop insurance in the 1980s.
Agricultural Insurance in the United States: What’s Relevant for the EU?
While  the  crop  insurance  program  in  the  United  States  continues  to  be  a  major  source  of  
government expenditures, several advances have been made in policy design, actuarial methods, 
and  program administration.  These  new developments  have  been  aimed  at  controlling  adverse 
selection, moral hazard, and program costs.  The most recent phenomenon in the United States is 
the growing popularity of revenue insurance. In 2015, roughly 70% of the total $102 billion liability 
in the US crop insurance program was tied to a revenue insurance policy. This popularity may 
demonstrate the importance of price variation in farm income volatility. 
The two most popular farm-level insurance policies in the US are Revenue Protection (RP) and 
Revenue Protection - Harvest Price Exclusion (RP-HPE). Revenue is determined by prices on the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange and farm-level yields. For this type of insurance to function properly, 
prices on the futures exchange should be representative of the prices that farmers receive around the 
country.  The benefit of using a futures market to determine payouts is that no single actor can 
influence market prices. Administrative costs are also likely to be lower as futures prices are readily 
available. One barrier to implementing a similar policy in the EU is that available futures markets  
may not be representative of local prices. 
RP and  RP-HPE  are  only  available  for  commodities  with  liquid  futures  markets.  To  provide 
insurance for farmers who are more diversified,  Whole Farm Revenue Protection (WFRP) was 
introduced in 2015 as a pilot program. A similar type of program may prove attractive in the EU 
where many farms produce a diverse set of crops or livestock. One disadvantage of this type of 
insurance is that, unlike the major revenue insurance policies, it relies on farm operation reports to 
establish historic and guaranteed farm revenue. This may not be an efficient practice in agricultural 
systems dominated by small and medium size farms. It is a more data intensive and time consuming 
enterprise than the sale of RP and RP-HPE, which only require the insurer to obtain farm-level yield 
histories.
As noted by Meuwissen et al. (2003), whole-farm income insurance carries a number of information 
asymmetries related to farm operation. The potential for moral hazard is likely to be significant.  
This additional propensity for hazardous behavior can be weighed against the practical concern of 
finding  an  appropriate  market  to  generate  price  expectations  for  revenue  insurance  policies. 
Provided that commodity prices are spatially co-integrated, such concerns may be unfounded. Even 
for commodities without active futures markets, such as short-grain rice,  the Risk Management 
Agency has still been able to devise procedures for generating expected and realized prices.
In contrast to the farm-level policies that we have mentioned, there are several area-yield insurance 
policies available in the US. While these policies are usually cheaper to administer than farm-level 
policies,  and  have  substantial  advantages  in  terms  of  minimizing  adverse  selection  and  moral 
hazard, they have proven to be unpopular with American farmers. Because these policies are based 
on area yields (at the county level), there is a significant amount of basis risk due to idiosyncratic 
shocks. Weather-based index insurance may provide a solution to basis risk problems because the 
spatial dimension can be defined in a flexible way. One example of an index based policy in federal 
crop insurance is Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage (PRF), which is based on rainfall.
The  sharing  of  risk  between  the  federal  government  and  private  insurers  has  proven  to  be  a 
significant factor in the growth of crop insurance in the United States. While not directly related to 
farm-level demand, reinsurance agreements encourage private companies to develop and market 
crop insurance policies. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) is  the US government 
corporation  that  carries  out  the  crop insurance  program.  The FCIC provides  a  reinsurance  and 
subsidy agreement to policies sold by cooperating private insurers. Risk sharing was integrated into 
the program in the early 1980s, shortly before the US saw a rapid increase in the uptake of federal 
crop insurance. Reinsurance agreements have encouraged private insurers to develop policies to 
meet farmer demand. An often ignored fact, at least by proponents of subsidized insurance, is that 
nearly 40 percent of planted acres for corn and soybeans in the US are covered under a private 
insurance policy (ARMS, 2010). Whether such policies are complementary to federal insurance is 
an open question. 
The Present State of Insurance in the EU
Single and multiple peril insurance policies are already available in several parts of Europe. Private 
single peril insurance can be purchased in the vast majority of member states. In terms of at least 
partially  subsidized single peril  or yield insurance programs, subsidies are available  in  Austria, 
Belgium, Croatia, France, Italy, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. 
Germany is the only country to offer multiple peril insurance without subsidies. The two largest 
programs are in Spain and Italy, which subsidize yield insurance premiums up to 65%. In spite of 
these  large  subsidies,  participation  has  historically  been low,  with  participation  in  Italy  around 
15%1.
Several countries have also begun to experiment with other forms of insurance beyond single peril 
and yield products. Weather-based index insurance has been proposed in France and Spain, but has 
not yet seen much success. Similar index based schemes are under consideration in Germany and 
Switzerland. Italy recently introduced revenue insurance for grains and is one of the first countries 
in the EU to implement this form of insurance that has been widely adopted in the US.
In 2016, France adopted a new type of insurance for field crops and certain fruits. This type of 
subsidized insurance provides payments against production cost increases, yield losses, and losses 
due to other factors such as quality and price declines. Although it operates in significantly different 
ways, the newly introduced French scheme can be compared to margin insurance in the US. Both 
essentially cover net revenue at the farm level.
Barriers to Subsidized Insurance
A likely reason for low uptake is that farmers have a variety of other instruments available for the 
mitigation of their  risks,  including farm management practices and various capital  investments. 
Significant  direct  payments  in  the  EU,  along  with  expectations  of  continued high prices,  both 
decrease the demand for insurance. From a practical standpoint, the inclusion of crop insurance in 
the second pillar of the CAP may result in trade-offs with other aspects of rural development  but 
impose additional  costs  for  national  budgets  (Tangermann,  2011).  One additional  barrier  to  the 
development of, and increased participation in, insurance markets in the EU is the disparate nature 
of the agricultural statistics necessary to implement a large-scale program. These statistics must be 
detailed and accurate in order to limit hazardous behaviors.
Even if future research shows that crop insurance would be preferable to other policy measures, 
policymakers in the EU would be faced with a number of program design problems.  Drawing on 
experiences with crop insurance in the United States, and research on demand in the EU, a holistic  
approach  may  prove to  be  the  most  effective  in  allaying  these  concerns.  This  approach  could 
include public-private partnerships with existing insurers, public reinsurance agreements, and the 
1Participation in Italy differs greatly by location (Santeramo et al., 2016); more than 50% of policies involve farms in 
the northeast of the country. Several structural factors explain this low participation: a vast majority of farms are very  
small (below 1 hectare in size), farmers in the southern regions tend to have significant off-fam incomes, and several  
forms of risk management are well established in the Italian agricultural system (eg. crop diversification, irrigation, 
etc.).
development of insurance policies that protect the farmer from both yield and price risk.
In lieu of a single system for agricultural insurance in the EU, there are several approaches that may 
be taken to establish an insurance scheme in cooperation with private insurers and member state’s 
existing  programs.  Public  support  of  reinsurance  is  likely  to  be  a  primary  factor  affecting  the 
development of markets. Reinsurers may be skeptical of taking on systemic agricultural risks, but 
evidence from the US shows that they are willing to do this with some level of public support. 
Leading EU insurance companies and reinsurers could act as catalysts for the transition toward a 
new era of agricultural insurance.
Recent work by Liesivaara and Myyrä (2015) has called into question the suitability of area-yield 
insurance for solving problems of crop insurance demand in Europe. In Finland, low correlations 
between farm and area yields implies that farmers would not benefit from area insurance. However, 
if correlations were higher, the insurer could face greater systemic risks. One possible correction for 
this  actuarial  problem is to stimulate cooperation in the provision of crop insurance across EU 
member  states.  Systemic  risk  can  be  countered  by  the  inclusion  of  heterogeneous  yields  from 
different geographic areas. Reinsurance would help insurers to cover some systemic exposure. In 
this  sense  a  more  widespread  insurance  program  might  be  more  viable  than  many  individual 
programs at the national level.
The regulatory framework could also be shifted further toward the subsidization of member state’s 
national systems and in particular toward revenue or income insurance: covering both yield and 
price  risk would  ensure greater  stability  of  farm incomes and result  in  increased  participation. 
Whether  insurance  subsidies  would  be  able  to  withstand  attacks  from the  WTO and  domestic 
budget hawks is questionable. It would be necessary to demonstrate the advantages of subsidized 
insurance when compared to other policy measures. As Tangermann (2011) notes, between 1995 
and 2005 the average annual payments over all EU members to ad-hoc programs or disaster funds 
was about 1 billion EUR. This suggests that there could be cost savings for some EU members.
The design of revenue policies could be completed on a country by country basis, with the EU 
subsidy serving to encourage development and implementation. Indeed the agricultural statistics 
necessary to operate such a program are not available EU-wide at the present time. Without detailed 
statistics on farms, there is serious potential for moral hazard in any insurance program. In the US, 
the United States Department of Agriculture has worked hand in hand with agricultural economists 
and statisticians to design, rate, and improve upon crop insurance policies. European states could 
follow this  strategy by promoting  cooperation  between government  agencies  and the  academic 
community. The specialized knowledge of agricultural economists throughout Europe could be put 
to work in constructing better policies. Area based policies or index policies might provide one 
avenue for insurance provision in areas without detailed farm level statistics.
Greater cooperation across the EU, and the construction of localized insurance policies, are not 
mutually exclusive goals. If the EU is to subsidize the policies in some way, then EU policymakers 
may demand control over the broad parameters of the underlying policies. Responsibility for the 
actuarial  fairness  of  the  crop  insurance  program  would  rest  in  Brussels.  Individual  member 
countries could propose schemes within the confines of broader EU restrictions; these schemes 
could be vetted by EU policymakers. These types of procedures would parallel developments in 
American crop insurance markets, where private insurers or commodity groups have constructed 
insurance plans that have later been adopted by the Risk Management Agency. Such developments 
could help promote sustainable agricultural insurance in the EU with possibilities for minimized 
distortions to agricultural markets. Results would depend on the integration of a crop insurance 
scheme with other policy measures.
Final remarks
While  in  the  long-run  it  may  be  desirable  to  establish  an  EU-wide  crop  insurance  program, 
impediments to implementation pose serious immediate doubts with respect to effectiveness and 
feasibility;  the  lack  of  a  representative  market  for  futures  and  the  substantial  heterogeneity  of 
agricultural  systems across  Europe are  a  few of  the  many challenges  that  must  be  faced.  The 
introduction of weather-based index insurance and revenue insurance may represent a temporary 
solution, bridging the gap toward a unified framework. We reiterate that greater cooperation across 
the  EU  and  the  construction  of  localized  insurance  policies  are  not  mutually  exclusive  goals. 
Policies may be implemented at the EU level to promote flexibility within national crop insurance 
schemes. At the level of individual member countries, different types of insurance can be designed 
to  take into  account  particular  local  agricultural  structures  and available  data.  In  all  cases,  the 
integration of a crop insurance scheme with other policy measures would be necessary to minimize 
distortions to agricultural markets.
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